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A NEGLIGENT CRIMINAL ASSAULT?
The generally accepted definition of criminal assault is that
of Hawkins wherein he says, "An assault is an attempt or offer
with force and violence to do a corporal hurt to another."'
Bishop's New Criminal Law defines an assault as any unlawful
physical force creating a reasonable apprehension of immedi-
ate physical injury to a human being.2 The difference between
these two definitions is indicative of the great confusion in the
law regarding the element of intent in a criminal assault.
Much of this confusion has resulted from the manner in
which courts have loosely denominated a particular act as an
assault when from a strictly legal standpoint the act was either
a battery or an assault and battery.3 The problem is further
complicated by the fact that courts have not defined with ex-
actness what is meant by the word intent as it is used in assault
cases.
There are two concepts of the word intent; (1) the intent
to do the act which results in the harm, and (2) the intent that
the act done will result in harm. In a broad sense, the intent
to do the act is present in every negligence case. The act of
firing into a moving train and thereby causing the death of
another has been held to be a negligent crime despite the fact
that firing the gun was intentional.4 An automobile driver who
causes the death of another by reckless driving intends to drive
the car, perhaps even to drive it carelessly, but ordinarily he
does not intend the harm that follows. However, if injury re-
sults, his act is criminal on the theory of negligence rather than
intention.5 Thus, the fact that the actor intended the act which
'Clark and Marshall, Criminal Law, (4th ed., 1940) 243; May,
Criminal Law, (4th ed., 1938) 247; Note (1939) 11 Rocky Mt. Law
Rev. 104.
'As quoted in May, Criminal Law, (4th ed., 1938), sec. 148,
note 1.
'The best example of this, perhaps, is the automobile cases in
which the courts speak in terms of assault where the act is actually
a battery. For a discussion of the different considerations presented
in cases of assault and of battery, see Hall, The Reckless Motorist,,
(1940) 31 Jour. Crim. Law 133, 137.
' Banks v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. App. 165, 211 S. W. 217 (1919).
"State v. Massey, 20 Ala. App. 56, 100 So. 625 (1924); State v.
Sheppard, 171 Minn. 414, 214 N. W, 280 (1927); State v. Weltz, 155
Minn. 143, 193 N. W. 42 (1923); State v. Trott, 190& N. Car. 674, 130
S.E. 627 (1925).
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resulted in harm does not mean that the crime is intentional
rather than negligent. It would seem that the second form of
intent, namely, the intent to cause physical injury, is the basis
of the distinction between intentional and negligent crimes.
Therefore this paper is limited to a discussion of the ele-
ment of intent to cause physical injury in cases which are, prop-
erly speaking, assaults.
The fact that some cases hold present ability to do the act
is not an essential element of the criminal assault, is some basis
for the contention that specific intent to injure is not necessary. 6
If the actor knew of his inability to inflict injury, it is submitted
that he could not possibly have intended to do so. If the actor
did not intend to inflict injury and is still guilty of assault, it
necessarily follows that specific intent to injure is not an ele-
ment of the crime.
The apprehension or fear of harm by the person assaulted
is the decisive factor in those cases holding present ability un-
necessary. Herein lies the second ground for holding specific
intent to injure an unnecessary element of the crime. A few of
the cases and some of the writers have reached the view that
the basis of the crime of assault should be the apprehension of
fear by the victim and not the intention of the actor.7 Thus, if
the crime can be predicated upon "the apprehension of fear"
theory-specific intent to injure would not necessarily be an
element of the crime.8
'Price v. United States, 156 Fed. 950, 85 C.C.A. 247 (1907);
Comm. v. White, 110 Mass. 407 (1872); State v. Barry, 45 Mont. 598,
124 Pac. 775 (1912); People v. Tremaine, 129 Misc. 650, 222 N.Y.
Supp. 432 (1927).
'Price v. United States, 156 Fed. 950, 85 C.C.A. 247 (1907);
Comm. v. White, 110 Mass. 407 (1872); Malone v. State, 77 Miss. 812,
26 So. 968 (1900); Beach v. Hancock, 27 N.H. 223, 59 Am. Dec. 373(1853).8 This doctrine has been attacked on two grounds. First, that the
application of the "apprehension of fear" doctrine as applied to crim-
inal law leaves no distinction between the tort and the crime of
assault. Note (1939) 11 Rocky Mt. Law Rev. 104, 107. Second, that
"apprehension of fear" cannot be the sole basis for the crime of
assault because a person can be assaulted in ignorance of the fact.
Note (1936) 26 Jour. Crim.Law 128, 131. To the first of these
objections it is submitted that there need be no distinction between
the tort and the crime of assault, except in negligence cases. There,
of course, the crime would require a higher degree of negligence
than the tort. Can it be said that it is inherently bad for the crim-
inal law to follow the civil? Society has the same interests at stake
in both the civil and criminal assault. In each case, society desires
protection from being put in fear of harm. To say that the theory
of the civil law is compensation and that of the criminal law is
NEGLIGENT CRiaINAL ASSAULT
A third argument for the recognition of the negligent crim-
inal assault is found in the trend of the law toward objectivity
as contrasted with subjective factors of the actor's mental state.
Thus, murder, manslaughter, and battery, all of which originally
required intent, now may be committed by negligence. The
trend in this direction in the case of assault is indicated by the
decisions which do not require proof of evil intent but imply
it from the act when the act is malum in se.9 Once the law starts
implying intent for any reason, it is but another step until the
blameworthy state of mind as shown by criminal negligence will
be allowed to take its place. There seems to be no apparent
reason why in assault, as in murder, negligence itself cannot
be a separate basis of the crime.
It is submitted that (1) the cases which do not require
present ability, (2) the cases and authorities which indicate that
the basis of the crime of assault is "apprehension of fear", and
(3) the trend of the law toward obectivity, all indicate that the
next step in the law should be the recognition of the negligent
criminal assault.' 0
An illustration will demonstrate the change advocated. Sup-
pose A fires a gun at B, intending only to scare B but which
nevertheless puts him in mortal fear of harm. Under Hawkin's
view this would not be an assault because the intent to cause
injury is lacking. Under Bishop's rule this would be an as-
punishment does not negative the fact that the act for which society
demands compensation may also be the same act from which it
demands protection by criminal punishment.
As to the second objection, it is not the theory of this paper that
the sole basis of the crime is apprehension of fear. Criminal neg-
ligence in itself is a blameworthy state of mind and while it is only
a fiction to say that this state of mind infers intent, courts have often
allowed this state of mind to take the place of intent. Cases holding
that no specific intent to injure is necessary are some authority for
the position that an intent implied from the negligence of the act
would be sufficient. Further it should be noted that all the cases
cited as sustaining the proposition that a person can be assaulted in
ignorance of the fact do not really bear this out. In practically all
the cases cited the victim was aware of the assault.
' State v. Baker, 20 R. 1. 275, 38 Atl. 653 (1897).
"Professor Kweigan reaches a similar conclusion in a different
manner. Commencing with the propositions that all batteries include
assaults and that batteries can be committed negligently, he reasons
that assaults too can be negligently committed. His conclusion rests
upon the theory that a battery is a consumated assault but there is
doubt as to the correctness of this assumption. Kweigan, Assault:
Is an Intent to Do Harm Requisite to a Criminal Assault? Note
(1929) 17 Geo.L.J. 56.
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sault.1 1 But suppose A without seeing B fired the gun negli-
gently in B's direction. Again under Hawkin's rule there would
be no assault because of the absence of an intent to injure. From
B's standpoint just as much harm has been done as if A had
fired the gun with the intention of killing him. For this reason
it is submitted that the criminal law should be enlarged to at-
tach responsibility for a negligent assault.
ROY VANCE, JR.
'State v. Triplett, 52 Kan. 678, 35 Pac. 815 (1894); State v.
Baker, 20 R.I. 275, 38 Atl. 653 (1897).
